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REGULATORY SCHIZOPHRENIA: MERGERS, ALLIANCES,
METAL-NEUTRAL JOINT VENTURES AND THE
EMERGENCE OF A GLOBAL AVIATION CARTEL
PAUL STEPHEN DEMPSEY*
I. INTRODUCTION
AIRLINES ARE A HIGH FIXED-COST, safety- and labor-in-tensive industry prone to destructive competition.1 Demand
is fickle, and fuel prices are volatile. In a manner consistent with
Garrett Hardin’s insight into the Tragedy of the Commons,2 after
deregulation, airline management has behaved in an individu-
ally rational and collectively irrational manner, competing away
airline profits in order to fill seats that otherwise would fly
empty.3 Destructive competition emerged from airline deregula-
tion,4 eventually causing every major pre-deregulation interstate
* Tomlinson Professor Emeritus of Global Governance in Air & Space Law
and Director Emeritus of the Institute of Air & Space Law, McGill University. ABJ,
JD, University of Georgia; LLM, George Washington University; DCL, McGill
University. The author was an Attorney-Advisor at the U.S. Civil Aeronautics
Board from 1977–79 and Transportation Lawyers Association Professor of
Transportation Law and Director of the Transportation Law Program at the
University of Denver from 1979–2002. He was also Vice Chairman of Frontier
Airlines and Chairman of Lynx Aviation.
1 See generally Paul Stephen Dempsey, The Financial Performance of the Airline In-
dustry Post-Deregulation, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 421 (2008); Paul Stephen Dempsey, Air-
line Deregulation and Laissez-Faire Mythology: Economic Theory in Turbulence, 56 J. AIR
L. & COM. 305 (1990).
2 See generally Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243
(Dec. 13, 1968), http://science.sciencemag.org/content/162/3859/1243.full
[https://perma.cc/8WM7-JZ9G].
3 Paul Stephen Dempsey, The Disintegration of the U.S. Airline Industry, 20
TRANSP. L.J. 9, 13–14 (1991).
4 Commercial airlines were deregulated by the Airline Deregulation Act of
1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705. This was followed by the Civil Aeronautics
Board Sunset Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-443, 98 Stat. 1703-04, which terminated
the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) and transferred its remaining responsibilities
to the Department of Transportation. One prominent deregulation apologist ex-
pressed why the deregulation movement gained bipartisan support in Congress,
stating,
3
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airline to collapse into bankruptcy.5 This led to massive cost-cut-
ting, service deterioration, restructuring, and, in more than 150
cases, bankruptcy and liquidation.6 Financial distress also cor-
roded management-labor relations. Once the finest commercial
aviation industry in the world and the launch customer for every
new aircraft that Boeing, Douglas, or Lockheed produced pre-
deregulation, U.S. airlines today no longer stand first in line for
deliveries. Nor are U.S. airlines today viewed as the world’s fin-
est. Businesspeople who fly across oceans tend to avoid U.S. air-
lines whose service levels have deteriorated enormously vis-a`-vis
their foreign counterparts.7
The U.S. Department of Transportation (USDOT) posts data
on several measurements of consumer abuse (e.g., delays of
Deregulation succeeded against industry opposition because it was
supported by a coalition of academics able to highlight concrete
examples of lower fares with less regulation, consumer groups, poli-
ticians looking for an anti-inflation or pro-free market issue, public
disgust with scandals, and charismatic individual spokesmen, all of
which excited a media blizzard that lasted for several years.
Michael E. Levine, Why Weren’t the Airlines Reregulated?, 23 YALE J. REG. 269, 291
(2006).
5 Paul Stephen Dempsey, The Cyclical Crisis in Commercial Aviation: Causes &
Potential Cures, 28 ANNALS AIR & SPACE L. 1, 17 (2003). Former American Airlines
CEO Bob Crandall observed:
Our airlines, once world leaders, are now laggards in every cate-
gory, including fleet age, service quality and international reputa-
tion . . . . [T]he financial health of the industry, and of the
individual carriers, has become ever more precarious. Most have
been through the bankruptcy process at least once, and some have
passed through on multiple occasions . . . . I feel little need to ar-
gue that deregulation has worked poorly in the airline industry.
Three decades of deregulation have demonstrated that airlines
have special characteristics incompatible with a completely unregu-
lated environment. To put things bluntly, experience has estab-
lished that market forces alone cannot and will not produce a
satisfactory airline industry, which clearly needs some help to solve
its pricing, cost and operating problems.
Terry Maxon, All Hail, Bob Crandall, DALLAS NEWS ¶¶ 10, 12, 21 (Apr. 2009),
https://www.dallasnews.com/business/airlines/2009/04/17/all-hail-bob-cran-
dall [https://perma.cc/W9RQ-GMPR] (quoting Robert L. Crandall at The
Wings Club).
6 See PAUL STEPHEN DEMPSEY & LAURENCE E. GESELL, AIRLINE MANAGEMENT:
STRATEGIES FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 205–09 (3d ed. 2012); see also Paul Stephen
Dempsey, Airlines in Turbulence: Strategies for Survival, 23 TRANSP. L.J. 15, 51–57
(1995); Paul Stephen Dempsey, The Prospectus for Survival and Growth in Commer-
cial Aviation, 19 ANNALS AIR & SPACE L. 163–64 (1994); Paul Stephen Dempsey,
Must the Airline Industry Collapse?, JURISCONSULTUS 59 (1994).
7 See Paul Stephen Dempsey, America’s Grand Experiment in Airline Deregulation:
Good Intentions Producing Bad Results, 14 ANNALS AIR & SPACE L. 21, 27–28 (1989).
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more than fifteen minutes, flight cancellations, denied board-
ing, lost bags).8 Consumer ratings of airlines reveal that the ul-
tra-low-cost carriers (ULCC) have the worst approval ratings.9
To thwart ULCC inroads, the major airlines have also skimmed
service amenities off the basic economy fares (which have been
lowered to ULCC levels or thereabouts) and imposed a la carte
supplemental pricing on reserved seating, checked and carry-on
bags, and items for which there were historically no separate
charges. Consumers appear to have resigned themselves to poor
quality service and, by and large, have stopped complaining ex-
cept when their adverse treatment is extreme. At the same time,
passenger rage appears to be growing, as reported incidents of
unruly passengers increase.10 Consumer frustration probably
contributes to that rage. In response, consumer protection legis-
lation and regulation is proliferating worldwide.11
To offset this unsustainable financial distress and to avoid re-
regulation, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) abdicated
while the industry consolidated. Further, the USDOT injected
airlines with antitrust immunity so that they could establish
global alliances, allowing competitors to collude on pricing, ca-
pacity, frequency, and service. The U.S. government jettisoned
both economic regulation and antitrust oversight, which had
historically protected the public interest, in favor of airline self-
regulation without meaningful government oversight, leaving an
industry characterized by collusion, monopolization, consumer
exploitation, and predation, with skeletal consumer
protection.12
8 See Air Travel Consumer Reports, U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP. 1, https://www.transpor
tation.gov/airconsumer/air-travel-consumer-reports [https://perma.cc/5UZB-
KKEE] (last updated Feb. 8, 2018).
9 Julian Mark Kheel, The Best and Worst Airlines in the United States, THEPOINTS
GUY.COM (Feb. 27, 2017), https://thepointsguy.com/guide/best-and-worst-air
lines-2017/ [https://perma.cc/S5SJ-L2JV].
10 More than 10,000 incidents of unruly passengers worldwide were reported
by airlines in 2015, up from 9,316 the year before. See Collaboration Needed to Stem
Unruly Passenger Incidents, IATA (Sept. 28, 2016), http://www.iata.org/press
room/pr/Pages/2016-09-28-01.aspx [https://perma.cc/69N5-MP3U].
11 See Int’l Civ. Aviation Org. [ICAO], Worldwide Air Transport Conference: Con-
sumer Protection and Definition of Passenger Rights in Different Contexts (July 12, 2012),
https://www.icao.int/Meetings/atconf6/Documents/WorkingPapers/ATConf6-
wp005_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/M24U-KRHC].
12 See generally Paul Stephen Dempsey, Predatory Practices & Monopolization in the
Airline Industry: A Case Study of Minneapolis/St. Paul, 29 TRANSP. L.J. 129 (2002);
Paul Stephen Dempsey, Predation, Competition & Antitrust Law: Turbulence in the
Airline Industry, 67 J. AIR L. & COM. 685 (2002).
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Of late though, airlines may have learned something from the
capacity and fare wars of the first several decades of deregula-
tion. If they refrain from fighting for market share, yields gener-
ate more sustainable revenue. Keeping load factors relatively
high facilitates yield maximization, as do government-sanc-
tioned price and service collusion.
This article examines the tortuous path from economic regu-
lation, to deregulation and liberalization, to consolidation and
collusion. It examines several elements of antitrust and competi-
tion law and policy, including mergers and acquisitions, coordi-
nation of pricing and service between competitors, and the
failure of governmental institutions to advance a coherent trans-
portation policy.
II. THE METAMORPHOSIS OF AIR TRANSPORT
AGREEMENTS
The Chicago Convention of 1944 laid the foundation for the
bilateral negotiation of traffic rights.13 Article 1 of the Conven-
tion affirms the “complete and exclusive sovereignty” of every
State “over the airspace above its territory.”14 Article 5 provides
certain traffic rights for non-scheduled flights, though poten-
tially restricted by “such regulations, conditions[,] or limita-
tions” as the underlying State may deem desirable.15 Article 6
prohibits scheduled international flights over the territory of a
State, “except with the special permission or other authorization
of that State, and in accordance with the terms of such permis-
sion or authorization.”16 Article 7 allows a State to restrict for-
eign airlines from engaging in for-hire domestic (cabotage) air
transport and prohibits the discriminatory authorization of cab-
otage rights to a foreign airline.17
The post-World War II era experienced a proliferation of bi-
lateral air transport agreements, beginning with the so-called
13 Convention on International Civil Aviation, Dec. 7, 1944, 61 Stat. 1180, 15
U.N.T.S. 295.
14 Id. art. 1.
15 Id. art. 5.
16 Id. art. 6.
17 See id. art. 7. “Cabotage involves permitting foreign carriers to operate com-
mercial segments of their flights within another country. This can be part of a
routing which takes the foreign carrier back to its own country or the operation
of a purely domestic flight within a foreign country.” Dennis Foerster, Caged Birds
in Open Skies: Comments on the Emergence of a Dominant Carrier, 1 ASPER REV. INT’L
BUS. & TRADE L. 171, 181 n.32 (2001).
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Bermuda I agreement between the United States and United
Kingdom in 1946. For four decades, the Bermuda I agreement
was the model for bilateral air transportation agreements con-
cluded worldwide, though many States departed from the
United States insistence on an explicit prohibition of capacity
predetermination and pooling.18 Government oversight back
then was largely promotional and protectionist in emphasis, fo-
cusing on avoiding “destructive competition” and on achieving a
balance between economic health for airlines and safe, efficient,
and reasonably-priced service for consumers. In the three de-
cades following World War II, the United States pursued a bilat-
eral negotiating policy which emphasized an equitable
exchange of economic benefits (i.e., a trading of operating
rights having approximately equal market value).19 During this
era, intercarrier agreements on tariffs under the auspices of the
International Air Transport Association (IATA) were the
norm.20
Pricing and entry were regulated in the United States with the
creation of the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) in 1938, which
continued until deregulation in 1978.21 Deregulation was de-
signed to encourage price and service competition between air-
lines. Yet, as we shall see, antitrust immunity enables
competitors to collude on pricing, capacity, and other compo-
nents of service.
In the wake of the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, the
United States concluded the first of its “liberal” bilateral air
transport agreements.22 Pricing provisions in these new first gen-
18 As we shall see below, the USDOT has since insisted on “metal neutral joint
ventures” as the price for conferring antitrust immunity. See infra Part III(D).
Those joint ventures usually include pooling of revenue or profits.
19 Frank E. Loy, Bilateral Air Transport Agreements: Some Problems of Finding a Fair
Route Exchange, in THE FREEDOM OF THE AIR 174–75 (Edward McWhinney & Mar-
tin A. Bradley eds., 1968).
20 PAUL STEPHEN DEMPSEY, LAW & FOREIGN POLICY IN INTERNATIONAL AVIATION
40–43 (1987).
21 Paul Stephen Dempsey, The Rise and Fall of the Civil Aeronautics Board—Open-
ing Wide the Floodgates of Entry, 11 TRANSP. L.J. 91, 115–16 (1979).
22 Liberal bilateral air transport agreements were concluded during 1978 be-
tween the United States and the Netherlands, Belgium, and Israel. Between 1978
and 1980, the United States concluded and signed eleven new “open skies”
Benelux-type bilaterals or amendments to existing bilateral air transport agree-
ments. Their tariff provisions encouraged low tariffs, set by individual airlines on
the basis of forces of the marketplace without reference to the ratemaking ma-
chinery of IATA. P.P.C. Haanappel, Bilateral Air Transport Agreements—1913–1980,
5 INT’L. TRADE L.J. 241, 261–62 (1980); Amir Ali Majid, Impact of Current U.S.
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eration “open skies” bilaterals placed an emphasis on the en-
couragement of low fares set by individual carriers on the basis
of forces in the marketplace, without reference to the IATA
ratemaking machinery.23 These bilaterals were characterized by
their opportunities for pricing flexibility,24 unrestricted capac-
ity,25 multiple designations,26 access to interior U.S. markets for
foreign-flag carriers,27 new fifth-freedom rights,28 country-of-ori-
gin charter rules,29 and elimination of discrimination and unfair
Policy on International Civil Aviation, 32 ZEITSCHRIFT FU¨R LUFT-UND WEL-
TRAUMRECHT [ZLW] 295, 299 (1983) (Ger.).
23 P.P.C. HAANAPPEL, PRICING AND CAPACITY DETERMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL
AIR TRANSPORT 42 (1984).
24 See Stanley B. Rosenfield, International Aviation: A United States Government-
Industry Partnership, 16 INT’L LAW. 473, 478 (1982); Richard H. Klem & Douglas V.
Leister, The Struggle for a Competitive Market Structure in International Aviation: The
Benelux Protocols Take United States Policies a Step Forward, 11 L. & POL’Y INT’L BUS.
557, 573–74 (1979). The pricing regimes of the first generation liberal bilaterals
are of two principal types. Country-of-origin pricing (concluded originally in the
bilaterals between the United States and the Netherlands and the United States
and the Federal Republic of Germany) allows the nation in whose territory the
flight originates to set the rate. See id. at 569. The most liberal provision, double
disapproval pricing (concluded first in bilaterals between the United States and
Belgium, Korea and Israel), allows the carrier’s proposed rate to go into effect
unless both nations object. See id. at 573. Layered on top of this regime was a
Memorandum of Understanding concluded between the United States and the
European Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC), which established a zone of reason-
ableness within which market conditions will set the rate.
25 “The right to fly any number of seats and any number of frequencies would
be determined by the carrier, based solely on market conditions.” Rosenfield,
supra note 24, at 478.
26 Multiple designations refers to the ability of a State to designate more than
one of its flag carriers to serve a particular route.
27 For example, direct access to Miami, Atlanta, Dallas/Fort Worth, San Juan,
Anchorage, and San Francisco was given to Germany; Atlanta and three addi-
tional cities were conferred to Belgium; and rights between Korea and New York,
Korea and Los Angeles, and Tokyo and Los Angeles were given to South Korea.
Review of U.S. International Aviation Policy: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Investiga-
tions and Oversight of H. Comm. on Public Works and Transportation, 97th Cong. 33-
249 (1981) (statement of William T. Seawell, Chairman and CEO, Pan American
World Airways). Another commentator summarized examples of foreign access
to interior United States points even more generously by saying that “Germany
has rights to 12 U.S. cities and has named 10 thus far, the United Kingdom has
rights to name 20 U.S. cities and has listed 17 so far on their major route.” Id. at
424 (statement of Donald C. Comlish, Vice President of International Affairs, Air
Transport Association).
28 Fifth-freedom rights enable an airline to carry traffic between two countries
outside its own State as long as the flight originates or terminates in its own State.
See Rosenfield, supra note 24, at 479.
29 Under this provision, charter flights are governed by the rules of the nation
in which the flight originates.
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methods of competition.30 They typically provided for either
country-of-origin31 pricing or mutual disapproval32 pricing, the
latter being the more liberal of the two. Prior to the sunset of
the Civil Aeronautics Board in 1984, the United States also
threatened revocation of IATA’s antitrust immunity, causing
IATA to divide itself in two—a trade association for non-tariff
activities and a traffic conference for ratemaking activities.33 The
major Benelux States (i.e., the Netherlands34 and Belgium35)
were the first to embrace the pro-competitive approach of the
United States by entering into liberal bilateral air transport
agreements, which surrendered restrictions on entry, capacity,
and pricing in exchange for access to lucrative interior U.S. mar-
kets.36 Of course, airlines that focus on sixth freedom37 traffic
would naturally favor liberal access to markets, and small States
with few major airports face little risk to their flag carriers in
trading unlimited access. By expeditiously authorizing multiple
U.S. flag entrants, the CAB hoped to put pressure on other Eu-
ropean governments in close geographic proximity to jump
aboard the competitive bandwagon so as to avoid the loss of lei-
sure and business travelers to Brussels and Amsterdam and the
loss of sixth freedom traffic flown over these cities by Sabena
and KLM, respectively.38
30 Richard H. Klem & Douglas V. Leister, The Struggle for a Competitive Market
Structure in International Aviation: The Benelux Protocols Take United States Policies a
Step Forward, 11 L. & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 557, 573–74 (1979); Paul Stephen Demp-
sey, The International Rate and Route Revolution in North Atlantic Passenger Transpor-
tation,17 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 393, 415 (1978); Majid, supra note 22, at
299–300.
31 Under country-of-origin pricing provisions, governmental authorities can
unilaterally disapprove a fare proposed by a carrier only if the route in question
originates within its own territory. See Klem & Leister, supra note 30, at 569.
32 Under mutual disapproval pricing provisions, neither State may disapprove
and suspend a proposed rate unless the other also disapproves of the rate in
question. In the event that the two States fail to agree, the carrier’s proposed rate
becomes effective. See id. at 573–74.
33 DEMPSEY, supra note 20, at 42.
34 Protocol Amending the Air Transport Agreement of 1957, Neth.-U.S., Mar.
31, 1978, T.I.A.S. No. 1507.
35 Agreement Amending the Air Transport Services Agreement of 1946, Belg.-
U.S., Dec. 12–14, 1978, T.I.A.S. No. 9207.
36 C.A.B. Order No. 78-9-2 (Sept. 1, 1978).
37 Under sixth freedom rights, an airline has the right to carry traffic between
two foreign countries via its own State. (Sixth freedom can also be viewed as a
combination of third and fourth freedoms secured by the State from two differ-
ent countries).
38 CAB Chairman Marvin Cohen subsequently noted the success of this ap-
proach. Review of U.S. International Aviation Policy: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
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In 1977, President Jimmy Carter appointed economist Alfred
Kahn as Chairman of the CAB.39 That set in motion promulga-
tion of the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, which deregulated
domestic pricing and entry and liberalized international mar-
kets.40 Kahn responded to the British refusal to embrace the
United States’ “open skies” ideology with an approach of, “let’s
stick it to the Brits—let’s put pressure on the Germans through
Amsterdam.”41 With the opportunity to engage in pricing com-
petition and serve interior U.S. points, Sabena and KLM began
to draw traffic away from their neighbors and to obtain signifi-
cant increases in market shares and tourist revenue.42
By the mid-1980s, the United States had concluded liberal bi-
laterals with Belgium, Costa Rica, Finland, Israel, Jordan, Ja-
maica, South Korea, Thailand, Taiwan, and Singapore.43 But
still, major European States were resistant; meanwhile, the Euro-
pean Union (EU) Commission in Brussels began to liberalize air
transport by regulatory fiat.44
Investigations and Oversight of H. Comm. on Public Works and Transportation, 97th
Cong. 567-864 (1981) (statement of Marvin S. Cohen, CAB Chairman).
39 See Michael Arria, The Surprising Collection of Politicos Who Brought Us Destruc-
tive Airline Deregulation, ALTERNET (July 3, 2016, 1:43 PM), http://www.alternet
.org/labor/how-liberals-deregulated-airline-industry [https://perma.cc/2YBY-
NRB5].
40 See Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705.
41 ANTHONY SAMPSON, EMPIRES OF THE SKY: THE POLITICS, CONTESTS AND CAR-
TELS OF WORLD AIRLINES 145 (1984).
[T]he U.S. government saw [the new liberal pro-competitive bi-
laterals] as a means of putting pressure on recalcitrant govern-
ments in the same geographic area. Thus, under this
“encirclement” theory, the United Kingdom was to be pressured by
expansion of air service to and via Belgium and The Netherlands.
Not too much later a new agreement with South Korea was in-
tended to put pressure on Japan.
MELVIN A. BRENNER ET AL., AIRLINE DEREGULATION 13 (1985) (citation omitted).
42 Review of U.S. International Aviation Policy: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Inves-
tigations and Oversight of H. Comm. on Public Works and Transportation, 97th Cong.
(1981). In 1977, Sabena was given the right to fly to Atlanta. No British carriers
could begin service under Bermuda II to this important sunbelt city until 1980.
See Robert R. Gray, The Impact of Bermuda II on Future Bilateral Agreements, 3 AIR L.
17, 21 (1978).
43 Peter Haanappel, An Analysis of U.S. Deregulation of Air Transport and Its Infer-
ences for a More Liberal Air Transport Policy in Europe, Comm. on Econ. Aff. & Dev.:
Council of Eur. Doc. at 52 (1985).
44 See Paul Stephen Dempsey, Competition in the Air: European Union Regulation of
Commercial Aviation, 66 J. AIR L. & COM. 979, 1010–18 (2001); Paul Stephen
Dempsey, European Aviation Regulation: Flying Through the Liberalization Labyrinth,
15 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 311, 321–22 (1992).
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In 1992, the USDOT began to pursue a second generation of
even more liberal “open skies” agreements rather indiscrimi-
nately. In a reprise of its 1978 strategy, the United States would
begin again, with the Dutch, in a rebounded effort to open the
skies with Europe’s Big Three—Germany, France, and the
United Kingdom. The USDOT identified the basic elements
that constitute the essential components of an “open skies” bilat-
eral air transport agreement:
1. Open entry on all routes . . . .
2. Unrestricted capacity and frequency on all routes . . . .
3. Unrestricted route and traffic rights, that is, the right to
operate service between any point . . . , including no re-
strictions as to intermediate and beyond points, change of
gauge, routing flexibility, coterminalization, or the right
to carry Fifth Freedom traffic . . . .
4. Double-disapproval pricing in Third and Fourth Freedom
markets, and price leadership in third country markets to
the extent that the Third and Fourth Freedom carriers in
those markets have it . . . .
5. Liberal charter arrangement (the least restrictive charter
regulations of the two governments would apply, regard-
less of the origin of the flight) . . . .
6. Liberal cargo regime (criteria as comprehensive as those
defined for the combination carriers) . . . .
7. Conversion and remittance arrangement (carriers would
be able to convert earnings and remit in hard currency
promptly and without restriction);
8. Open code-sharing opportunities . . . .
9. Self-handling provisions (right of a carrier to perform/
control its airport functions going to support its opera-
tions) . . . .
10. Procompetitive provisions on commercial opportunities,
user charges, fair competition and intermodal rights . . . .
11. Explicit commitment for nondiscriminatory operation of
and access for computer reservation systems.45
In November 1992, the USDOT gave Northwest/KLM prelim-
inary antitrust immunity to create the first integrated interna-
tional intercarrier alliance.46 “Final approval was given only days
45 In the Matter of Defining “Open Skies,” Order No. 92-8-13, at 3–6 (U.S.
Dep’t of Transp. Aug. 5, 1992).
46 PAUL STEPHEN DEMPSEY, EUROPEAN AVIATION LAW 172 (2004). “Some specu-
lated the decision was predicated on the $100,000 contribution Northwest co-
chairman Gary Wilson had made to Bush’s committee to re-elect the President in
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before the inauguration of Bill Clinton as President in January
1993.”47 The alliance enabled these two airlines to draw enor-
mous traffic from their rivals in the Trans-Atlantic market. The
aim was strategic. If KLM bled enough traffic from its nearby
rivals, those airlines might lobby their governments to conclude
“open skies” agreements with the United States so that they too
could enjoy antitrust immunity with U.S. airlines.
The “divide and conquer” strategy began to work. By 1995,
the United States had concluded “open skies” agreements with
nine additional European countries. Germany fell in 1996, fol-
lowed by the Czech Republic, Italy, Portugal, the Slovak Repub-
lic, Malta, Poland, and, in 2002, France. With the signing of an
“open skies” agreement with India on January 15, 2005, the
United States had concluded “open skies” agreements with sixty-
seven States worldwide, including fifteen of the twenty-five EU
members.48 By 2017, the United States had concluded “open
skies” bilateral air transport agreements with more than 120
States.49
Although a public interest rationale for approving the first al-
liance antitrust immunity between Northwest and KLM had
been to “promote competition by furthering our efforts to ob-
tain less restrictive aviation agreements with other European
countries,”50 the USDOT continued to grant antitrust immunity
profligately long after all the major European dominos had
fallen. By 2007, the United States had concluded an “Open
Skies Plus” agreement with the EU, opening up all city-pairs be-
tween the United States and EU for all U.S. and European air-
lines.51 The “Plus” part of the agreement included liberalization
of foreign ownership rules that the USDOT embraced with a
proposed regulation to skirt around the legislative prohibition,
but Congress quickly and decisively aborted this proposed regu-
August 1992. In contrast, four years earlier he had contributed to Democrat
Michael Dukakis’ Presidential campaign.” Id. at 172 n.64.
47 Id. at 172.
48 John Byerly, Deputy Assistant Sec’y for Transp. Affairs, U.S.-EU Aviation Re-
lations—Charting the Course for Success, Remarks to the International Aviation
Club (July 13, 2004).
49 PAUL STEPHEN DEMPSEY, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL AIR LAW 698–99 (2d ed.
2017).
50 Joint Application of Alitalia-Linee Aeree Italiance-S.p.A. et al., DOT Order 2008-4-
17 (2008); Joint Application of Northwest Airlines, Inc. and KLM Royal Dutch Airlines,
DOT Order 93-1-11 (1993).
51 DEMPSEY, EUROPEAN AVIATION LAW, supra note 46, at 725–27.
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lation.52 Antitrust immunity no longer became a means of facili-
tating “open skies” bilaterals; paradoxically, it became a means
of facilitating creation of anticompetitive alliances of a particu-
lar type: “metal neutral joint ventures.”53
III. AIRLINE ALLIANCES
Since the dawn of commercial aviation, airlines have engaged
in cooperative relationships. In part, these arrangements have
been necessary to move passengers and freight beyond airline
route systems. Interlining has long been an essential component
of international air travel. For many decades, IATA served as
facilitator of fare and capacity coordination between airlines. In
recent decades, however, antitrust scrutiny has forced IATA to
retreat in facilitating cooperation in areas of parallel routes,
though it continues to facilitate end-to-end coordination.





• reciprocal airport agreements;
• blocked space relationships (capacity purchase
agreements);
• computer reservations systems joint ventures;
• joint sales offices and telephone centers;
• e-commerce joint ventures;
• frequent flyer program alliances;
• code-sharing;
• coordination of pricing and scheduling;
• pooling of traffic and revenue; and
• Metal Neutral Profit Sharing Joint Ventures54
Chart 1 depicts the hierarchy of intercarrier agreements, with
those at the left end being less integrated (and less anticompeti-
tive) vis-a`-vis those on the right.
52 Id.
53 See discussion infra Part III.D.
54 DEMPSEY & GESELL, supra note 6, at 647.
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Chart 1 – Hierarchy of Intercarrier Agreements
Chart 1 – Hierarchy of Intercarrier 
Agreements 
A. ANTITRUST & COMPETITION: A SUCCINCT SUMMARY OF U.S.
& EU LAWS
Competition and antitrust laws attempt to ensure that com-
petitors compete fairly so that price and service levels are re-
sponsive to consumer demand, prices drop to marginal costs,
and consumer welfare is enhanced. Law in this area seeks to:
• Prohibit collusion between competitors that restrain trade,
such as price-fixing;
• Prohibit monopolization through mergers or acquisitions;
and
• Prohibit monopolization through anticompetitive means,
such as predation or abuse of a dominant position.
The United States has promulgated several such laws, including:
• Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890;
• Clayton Act of 1914;
• Robinson-Patman Act of 1936;
• Federal Trade Commission Act of 1938; and
• Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 (Federal Aviation Act of
1958).
Similarly, Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union (TFEU) prohibits “all agreements between un-
dertakings, . . . which may affect trade . . . and which have as
their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of
competition . . . .”55
55 Article 101 provides:
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Examples include:
• Price-fixing;
• Limitation or control of production;
• Shared markets or sources of supply;
• Applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions,
placing other trading parties at a competitive disadvantage;
and
• Making the conclusion of contracts subject to approval by
others without commercial justification.
In the EU, companies found guilty of such activities may face a
fine of up to ten percent of annual turnover.
1. The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the inter-
nal market: all agreements between undertakings, decisions by as-
sociations of undertakings and concerted practices which may
affect trade between Member States and which have as their object
or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition
within the internal market, and in particular those which:
(a) directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices or any other
trading conditions;
(b) limit or control production, markets, technical development,
or investment;
(c) share markets or sources of supply;
(d) apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with
other trading parties, thereby placing them at a competitive
disadvantage;
(e) make the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the
other parties of supplementary obligations which, by their nature
or according to commercial usage, have no connection with the
subject of such contracts.
2. Any agreements or decisions prohibited pursuant to this Article
shall be automatically void.
3. The provisions of paragraph 1 may, however, be declared inap-
plicable in the case of:
- any agreement or category of agreements between undertakings;
- any decision or category of decisions by associations of
undertakings;
- any concerted practice or category of concerted practices,
which contributes to improving the production or distribution of
goods or to promoting technical or economic progress, while al-
lowing consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit, and which
does not:
(a) impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions which are
not indispensable to the attainment of these objectives;
(b) afford such undertakings the possibility of eliminating competi-
tion in respect of a substantial part of the products in question.
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 101, Mar. 25, 1957, 2012
O.J. (C 326) 47.
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B. RESTRAINT OF TRADE
It is unlawful in many countries around the world for compet-
itors to agree to fix prices or divide territory. In the United
States, Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits combinations and
conspiracies in restraint of trade.56 To prevail on a claim that a
horizontal agreement among competitors restrains trade, the
plaintiff must prove:
1. defendants engaged in a conspiracy;
2. that restrained trade;
3. in the relevant market; and
4. competitors suffered injury.57
The U.S. Supreme Court has identified three methods of assess-
ing whether a horizontal agreement violates Section 1 of the
Sherman Act:
1. the per se analysis, for restraints which are obviously an-
ticompetitive, such as price-fixing, territorial allocations,
group boycotts, or tying arrangements;
2. the quick-look analysis, for restraints with some procompeti-
tive justification; and
3. the rule of reason test, for restraints whose net impact on
competition is difficult to determine.58
An aggrieved party must prove the restraint is unreasonable
or, in other words, harmful to competition. The purpose of the
antitrust laws is to protect competition, not to protect individual
competitors.59 Thus, it is not enough to show that the restraint
caused a competitor to suffer economic injury. To determine
whether the agreement has an adverse effect on competition,
courts examine factors such as reduced output, increased prices,
and decreased quality.60 In the United States, horizontal collu-
56 Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2017).
57 See Law v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 134 F.3d 1010, 1016 (10th Cir.
1998).
58 See Cal. Dental Ass’n v. F.T.C., 526 U.S. 756, 779-81 (1999); see generally
F.T.C. v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986); Palmer v. BRG of Ga., Inc.,
498 U.S. 46 (1990); Cont’l Airlines v. United Airlines, 277 F.3d 499 (4th Cir.
2002).
59 See Kate Markhvida, Antitrust and Competition Law, in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK
OF PUBLIC AVIATION LAW 308 (Paul Stephen Dempsey & Ram S. Jakhu eds.,
2017).
60 See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 553–55 (2007); Brooke Grp.
Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 212 (1993); Atl. Rich-
field Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 338 (1990); Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort
of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 117–18 (1986); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith
Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 598 (1986); Virgin Atl. Airways Ltd. v. British Airways
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sion can result in criminal prosecution by the Justice Depart-
ment, or a civil suit brought by a competitor or consumer in
which treble damages are potentially recoverable by the ag-
grieved party.
As an example of unlawful collusion in the aviation sector, the
air cargo fuel surcharge litigation proved enormously expensive
for airlines. The conspiracy to fix fuel surcharges began in 1996
when IATA passed Resolution 116ss on fuel surcharges. How-
ever, the USDOT denied antitrust immunity. Nevertheless, a
number of air carriers continued to coordinate fuel surcharges.
But since the charges were not tied to distance flown, they were
not correlated with fuel consumption. Fuel prices fell in 2001,
but the surcharges continued.
In the early years of the new millennium, Lufthansa and its
subsidiary Swiss International turned “state’s evidence” so as to
enter the corporate leniency program. They revealed that a
number of airlines (including Lufthansa, Lan Chile, Air France,
British Airways, Japan Airlines, Korean Airlines, American Air-
lines, SAS, Asiana Airlines, Polar Air, Cathay Pacific, Atlas Air,
and Cargolux) had conspired to impose uniform fuel and secur-
ity surcharges. In 2006, law enforcement officers raided the of-
fices of several airlines.61 Twenty airlines and four executives
pled guilty and paid fines. British Airways and Korean Airlines
paid fines totaling $300 million in settlement of a DOJ
investigation.62
As of 2011, twenty-two airlines and twenty-one airline execu-
tives had been charged with unlawful price fixing.63 More than
$1.8 billion in criminal fines were imposed, and four executives
were sent to prison. More than one hundred civil class action
lawsuits were filed by private plaintiffs in the United States
alone, resulting in settlements of nearly half a billion dollars. By
2012, fines totaled almost $2 billion. As Table 1 reveals, the EU
Commission imposed fines of C= 776 million on eleven air cargo
PLC, 257 F.3d 256, 264 (2d Cir. 2001). See also Shubha Ghosh & Darren Bush,
Predatory Conduct and Predatory Legislation: Exclusionary Tactics in Airline Markets, 45
HOUS. L. REV. 343, 350–52 (2008).
61 William M. Hannay, The Air Cargo Antitrust Conspiracy, TERRALEX 1–2, ter-
ralex.org/calendar/event/4083c84eea/downloadfile?fileid=27c52bf9a3 (last vis-
ited Feb. 21, 2018).
62 Id.
63 Id.
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carriers that participated in the scheme from December 1999 to
February 2006.64
Table 1 - Fines Imposed by the European Union on Airlines
for Price-Fixing on Fuel Surcharges
Reduction under the
Fine (C= )* Leniency Notice
Air Canada 21 037 500 15%
Air France 182 920 000 20%
KLM 127 160 000 20%
Martinair 15 400 000 50%
British Airways 104 040 000 10%
Cargolux 79 900 000 15%
Cathay Pacific Airways 57 120 000 20%
Japan Airlines 35 700 000 25%
LAN Chile 8 220 000 20%
SAS 70 167 500 15%
Singapore Airlines 74 800 000 0
Lufthansa 0 100%
Swiss International Air Lines 0 100%
64 Press Release IP/17/661, European Commission, Antitrust: Commission Re-
Adopts Decision and Fines Air Cargo Carriers C= 776 Million for Price-Fixing Car-
tel (Mar. 17, 2017), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-661_en.htm
[https://perma.cc/8VQA-DXGA]. However, the conscious parallelism allegation
did not fare well in a case alleging collusion between Delta Airlines and AirTran
to fix prices on baggage fees. The court noted, “Plaintiffs need not allege the
existence of collusive communications in ‘smoke-filled rooms’ in order to state a
§ 1 Sherman Act claim. Rather, such collusive communications can be based
upon circumstantial evidence and can occur in speeches at industry conferences,
announcements of future prices, statements on earnings calls, and in other pub-
lic ways. . . . [U]nlawful conspiracies may be inferred when collusive communica-
tions among competitors precede changed/responsive business practices, such as
new pricing practices.” In re Delta/AirTran Baggage Fee Antitrust Litig., 733 F.
Supp. 2d 1348, 1360–61 (N.D. Ga. 2010) (citations omitted). Nonetheless, the
court concluded, “Even when viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, the
evidence in this case simply does not permit a reasonable factfinder to infer the
existence of a conspiracy, as it does not tend to exclude the possibility that the
alleged conspirators acted independently.” See Joyce Hanson, Delta, AirTran Score
Win In Bag-Fee MDL, LAW360 (Mar. 29, 2017, 4:22 PM), https://www.law360.com/
articles/907594/delta-airtran-score-win-in-bag-fee-mdl [https://perma.cc/GS8A-
SE2K].
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C. MERGERS & CONSOLIDATIONS
Mergers raise antitrust concerns as well. Market concentration
may reduce competition causing consumers to suffer higher
prices and poorer service. Approximately one hundred States
around the world have promulgated pre-merger notification leg-
islation. Requirements range from simple notification to inten-
sive investigations. Typically, jurisdictional thresholds are
determined by the size of the transaction. Merger reviews may
include transaction suspension, non-suspension, or hybrid ap-
proaches depending upon potential impact of the transaction
on the economy. The principal concern is whether, post-
merger, the entity will have market power to raise prices. Cross-
border ownership is constrained by nationality rules in many
States. Foreign ownership in U.S. airlines has been limited to
twenty-five percent voting stock since the 1920s.65 In the EU, for-
eign ownership by non-EU citizens is restricted to forty-nine per-
cent. Most bilateral air transport agreements also allow a State to
prohibit another State’s airlines from enjoying traffic rights
under the bilateral if the airline’s nationals do not have “sub-
stantial ownership and effective control.”66 However, these re-
quirements are often waived.67 Table 2 reveals foreign
ownership restrictions in several States.
65 To qualify as a U.S. flag carrier, U.S. citizens must: (1) hold at least 75% of
the voting equity; (2) hold at least 51% of non-voting equity; and (3) effectively
“control” the airline. See U.S. Air Carriers, U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., https://www
.transportation.gov/policy/aviation-policy/licensing/US-carriers [https://perma
.cc/7BNE-BHHY] (last visited Jan. 25, 2018). Foreign ownership restrictions are
not unique to aviation and exist in broadcasting, telecommunications, electric
and nuclear power production, shipping, and banking.
66 Section 5 of the Transit Agreement and Section 6 of the Transport Agree-
ment provide: “Each contracting State reserves the right to withhold or revoke a
certificate or permit to an air transport enterprise of another State in any case
where it is not satisfied that substantial ownership and effective control are vested
in nationals of a contracting State . . . .” See International Air Services Transit
Agreement art. 1, sec. 5, opened for signature Dec. 7, 1944, 59 Stat. 1693, E.A.S. No.
487. “Like their predecessors, modern ‘Open Skies’ bilaterals require that ‘sub-
stantial ownership and effective control’ be vested in the nationals of the state
designating the airline, and that failure to meet this requirement . . . would enti-
tle either nation to revoke, suspend or limit the operations of the offending air-
line.” Paul Stephen Dempsey, Nationality Requirements and Cabotage Restrictions in
International Aviation: Sovereignty Won and Sovereignty Lost, 20 STUD. AIR & SPACE L.
129, 134 (2006).
67 The United States typically waives the nationality requirements for airlines
holding their operating certificates from States that satisfy FAA Category I safety/
security requirements, and have concluded an “Open Skies” bilateral with the
United States.
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Table 2 - Status of Foreign Ownership Restrictions for Airlines
in Selected Countries68
EU 49%
Australia 49% for international (25% single); 100% for domestic
Canada 25% of voting equity (15% single)
Japan 33.33%
New Zealand 49% for international; 100% for domestic
25% of voting equity; 1/3 of board at maximum; cannot be
United States
chairman of board
But, domestic airline mergers are possible. Prior to 1985, air-
line mergers and acquisitions in the United States required ap-
proval from the CAB. Approval automatically conferred
antitrust immunity. Between the sunset of the CAB on Decem-
ber 31, 1984, and 1989, airline mergers were regulated by the
USDOT. Thereafter, airline mergers would be handled like
mergers in any other industry, scrutinized by the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) and DOJ under the Clayton Act. Since 1989,
airline mergers have been subject to Section 7 of the Clayton
Act.69
But for the few years the USDOT had jurisdiction, the US-
DOT never met a merger it did not like, approving each of the
twenty-one merger applications submitted to it, even those to
which the DOJ vigorously objected (i.e., Northwest-Republic
and TWA-Ozark). Though the pace of airline mergers slowed
after the DOJ obtained jurisdiction, the pace picked up again as
financial distress and bankruptcies increased after the turn of
the twenty-first century.
The Clayton Act prohibits a person “engaged in commerce or
in any activity affecting commerce” from acquiring “the whole
or any part” of a business if the acquisition may substantially
“lessen competition” or “tend to create a monopoly.”70 The FTC
and DOJ evaluate the relevant geographic and product market,
using reasonable interchangeability or cross-elasticity of demand
analysis. Although market share and concentration levels are rel-
68 ALEX COSMAS ET AL., FRAMING THE DISCUSSION ON REGULATORY
LIBERALIZATION: A STAKEHOLDER ANALYSIS OF OPEN SKIES, OWNERSHIP AND
CONTROL 2 (2008). These authors also found no significant increase in
transatlantic service levels subsequent to conclusion of “Open Skies” bilateral air
transport agreements. See Alex Cosmas et al., The Effects of Open Skies Agreements on
Transatlantic Air Service Levels, 16 J. AIR TRANSP. MGMT. 222, 222–24 (2010).
69 See Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2017).
70 See id. at 15 U.S.C. §§ 12–27; 29 U.S.C. §§ 52–53.
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evant, they are not conclusive. Instead, courts examine the mar-
ket’s structure, history, and future; the characteristics of the
customers; the trends toward concentration; the existence of
competitors; and the barriers to entry.71 Also examined is
whether the merger or acquisition create or enhance market
power? This is more likely where the merging entities are direct
competitors (known as horizontal mergers). The FTC and DOJ
have developed Horizontal Merger Guidelines.72 Table 3 lists
the major U.S. airline mergers which have transpired since air-
line deregulation in 1978:
71 See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 343–45 (1962); United
States v. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 362 (1963); see also Robert A. Skitol &
Kenneth M. Vorrasi, The Remarkable 50-Year Legacy of Brown Shoe Co. v. United
States, ANTITRUST (2012), http://files.drinkerbiddle.com/Templates/media/
files/Outside%20Publications/Skitol-Vorrasi-Article-in-Antitrust-
(Spring%202012).pdf [https://perma.cc/T3Z8-BYBT].
72 See generally U.S. Dep’t of Justice & F.T.C., Horizontal Mergers Guidelines
(2010), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/mergers/
100819hmg.pdf [https://perma.cc/SV4N-PRQJ]; see also Keith N. Hylton, Brown
Shoe Versus the Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 39 REV. INDUS. ORG. 95, 95 (2011).
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Table 3 – Selected U.S. Major Airline Mergers
Since Deregulation73
(acquired carrier on left)
1979 National – Pan Am
1980 Seaboard – Flying Tigers
Hughes Airwest – Republic
1982 Continental – Texas International
1985 Frontier – People Express
Muse – Southwest
1986 Pan Am – United
Republic – Northwest
Ozark – TWA
Eastern – Texas Air
People Express – Texas Air
Western – Delta
Horizon – Alaska
1987 Air Cal – American
PSA – USAir
Piedmont – USAir
1988 Flying Tigers – Federal Express
1997 AirTran – ValuJet
1998 Reno Air – American
2001 TWA – American
2004 USAirways – America West
2008 Northwest – Delta
2009 Midwest – Republic
Frontier – Republic
2010 Continental – United
2011 AirTran – Southwest
2013 American – USAirways
2015 TNT Express – FedEx
2016 Southern Air – Atlas Air
Virgin America – Alaska Airlines
The merger of United and Continental Airlines drew antitrust
fire from a number of concerned citizens. During the trial, their
expert witnesses identified three alternative relevant markets:
(1) network carriers competing for business travelers; (2) air-
port-pairs; and (3) the U.S. airline industry as a whole.74 As to
73 For a more complete list, see DEMPSEY & GESELL, supra note 6, at 232.
74 Malaney v. UAL Corp., No. 3:10-CV-02858-RS, 2010 WL 3790296, at *7 (N.D.
Cal. Sept. 27, 2010).
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the first category, the court concluded, “. . . because the plain-
tiffs have failed to show why LCCs should be excluded from a
market for business passengers . . . network carriers catering to
business passengers simply does not fly as a viable relevant geo-
graphic and product market for purposes of Section 7 analy-
sis.”75 As to airport-pairs, the court found that “competition
from adjacent airports disciplines pricing and must be consid-
ered when defining the relevant market. . . . [G]iven the sub-
stantial evidence suggesting city-pairs [may be the appropriate
market], plaintiffs’ effort to establish anything else never leaves
the gate.”76
As to the third alternative proffered by plaintiffs (the “na-
tional market”), the court noted that it was unclear how a flight
from San Francisco to Newark competed with a flight from Seat-
tle to Miami.77 The pound of flesh surrendered for DOJ acquies-
cence in the merger was for the merged carrier to lease slots for
eighteen round-trip flights to Southwest Airlines at Newark In-
ternational Airport.
In August 2013, the DOJ and six state Attorney Generals filed
suit to block the merger of US Airways and American Airlines.78
They noted that after the Delta-Northwest and United-Conti-
nental mergers, American, Delta, and United ceased challeng-
ing the others’ nonstop fares with lower connecting fares and
also marched in lock-step on ancillary fees. US Airways provided
connecting price competition. Concentration at Washington
Reagan Airport, where the combined carrier would hold sixty-
nine percent of the landing slots, was also of concern.79
By October, a settlement had been reached with the DOJ. The
pound of flesh surrendered by the carrier for antitrust acquies-
cence was the sale of 104 slots at Ronald Reagan Washington
International Airport, a promise to maintain service to small
and mid-size cities from Reagan, the sale of two gates at Chicago
O’Hare International Airport, and the maintenance of hubs at
75 Id. at *9.
76 Id. at *11.
77 Id. at *12.
78 Justice Department Files Antitrust Lawsuit Challenging Proposed Merger Between US
Airways and American Airlines, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (Aug. 13, 2013), https://www
.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-files-antitrust-lawsuit-challenging-pro-
posed-merger-between-us-airways-and [https://perma.cc/FJ3D-7ASC].
79 Roger W. Fones, Airline Consolidations and Competition Law—What Next?, 10
FIU L. REV. 447, 451 (2015).
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New York Kennedy, Charlotte, Chicago, Los Angeles, Miami,
Philadelphia, and Phoenix for three years.
Since 1991, the United States and the EU have coordinated
regulatory review on transatlantic mergers, acquisitions, and alli-
ances. For example, Boeing’s acquisition of McDonnell-Douglas
was reviewed by the EU Commission.80 Under the EU Merger
Control Regime, “A concentration which would significantly im-
pede effective competition, in the common market or in a sub-
stantial part of it, in particular as a result of the creation or
strengthening of a dominant position, shall be declared incom-
patible with the common market.”81
Although transatlantic mergers are prohibited by the statutory
restrictions on foreign ownership, as discussed above, major
cross-border airline mergers (e.g., Air France/KLM, British Air-
ways/Iberia, Lufthansa/Austrian) have still been concluded
within the EU. Middle Eastern air carriers also have purchased
significant minority stakes in a number of European carriers
(e.g., Etihad Airways purchased significant equity in Air Berlin
and Alitalia).82 Table 4 reveals several of the major non-US air-
line acquisitions:
80 See DEMPSEY, EUROPEAN AVIATION LAW, supra note 46, at 118–26.
81 Council Regulation 139/2004 of Jan. 20, 2004, EC Merger Regulation, 2004
O.J. (L24) 1, 7.
82 See Robert Wall & Rory James, Etihad to Buy 49% Stake in Alitalia, WALL ST. J.
(June 25, 2014, 1:49 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/etihad-to-buy-49-stake-
in-alitalia-1403685852. However, by 2017, Etihad began to retreat from its profli-
gate investment strategy as it lost $1.87 billion, much of which was attributable to
writing down its collapsing investments in Air Berlin and Alitalia. Robert Wall, Air
Berlin Files for Bankruptcy Protection After Biggest Investor Ends Support, WALL ST. J.
(Aug. 15, 2017, 9:19 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/air-berlin-files-for-insol-
vency-after-biggest-investor-ends-support-1502797334.
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Table 4 – Selected Major Non-U.S. Airline Acquisitions
Date Acquired Airline Acquiring Airline Percentage
2000 Canadian Airlines Air Canada 100%
Ansett Australia Air New Zealand 100%
2001 JAS Japan Air Lines 100%
2004 KLM Air France 100%
2005 Swiss Lufthansa 100%
2008 JetBlue Lufthansa 19%
BMI Lufthansa 100%
2009 Austrian Airlines Lufthansa 100%
Germanwings Lufthansa 100%
Brussels Airlines Lufthansa 45%
2010 Iberia British Airways 100%
2011 TAM LAN 100%
Iberia British Airways 100%
Air Berlin Etihad 29%
2012 Air Seychelles Etihad 40%
Aer Lingus Etihad 3%
2013 Air Serbia Etihad 49%
Jet Airways Etihad 24%
Darwin Airlines Etihad 34%
2014 Alitalia Etihad 49%
Darwin Airline Etihad 34%
Aer Lingus British Airways 100%
2016 Virgin Australia Etihad 22%
Brussels Airlines Lufthansa 100%
Singapore Airlines has launched new airlines targeting vari-
ous market niches—Scoot, Tiger Airways, and Silk Air. Some
Southeast Asian airlines (e.g., Tiger Airways and Air Asia) are
also setting up branded affiliates in nearby countries. For exam-
ple, Air Asia operates companies in Malaysia, Indonesia, Japan,
and India. LATAM operates several airlines in Latin American
countries, including Chile, Brazil, Argentina, Ecuador, Para-
guay, and Peru. Thus, airline ownership and nationality are be-
coming increasingly blurred, despite the “foreign ownership
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and effective control” provisions83 in air transport agreements
and in domestic laws.84
D. AIRLINE ALLIANCES & ANTITRUST IMMUNITY
Intercarrier agreements have long been a feature of interna-
tional aviation. Airlines routinely agree to share ticketing, board-
ing, baggage handling, catering, maintenance services, gates,
lounges, and reciprocal frequent flyer programs. Interline rela-
tions also require an agreement on ticketing and baggage, as
well as an end-to-end pricing agreement. In recent years, how-
ever, airlines have sought, and regulators have conferred, anti-
trust immunity on agreements in competitive markets,
addressing issues which otherwise would be deemed collusive
and unlawful, such as:
• coordination of routes and scheduling;
• coordination of pricing and inventory management;
• joint marketing and distribution; and
83 The “substantial ownership and control” requirements are found in the bi-
lateral air transport agreements, the multilateral transit and transport agree-
ments, and the MALIAT (Kona) Accord. Almost all bilateral air transport
agreements and multilateral transit and transport agreements require that carri-
ers designated thereunder “be substantially owned and effectively controlled” by
citizens of the State that issues them an operating certificate. For example, Sec-
tion 5 of the Air Transit Agreement, and Section 6 of the Air Transport Agree-
ment, both provide, inter alia: “Each contracting State reserves the right to
withhold or revoke a certificate or permit to an air transport enterprise of an-
other State in any case where it is not satisfied that substantial ownership and
effective control are vested in nationals of a contracting State . . . .” See Interna-
tional Air Services Transit Agreement art. 1, sec. 5, opened for signature Dec. 7,
1944, 59 Stat. 1693, E.A.S. No. 487. Hence, there is no concept of “flags of conve-
nience” in aviation as there is in maritime law. The United States has waived the
nationality requirements for airlines registered in States that meet FAA Category
I safety and security requirements and that concluded an open skies bilateral
agreement with the United States.
84 Examples include:
• Alliances: e.g., Star, SkyTeam, and Oneworld;
• Metal Neutral Joint Ventures: e.g., United-Air Canada-Lufthansa;
• Multiple Hubs: e.g., Lan hubs in Argentina, Ecuador, Peru, and Chile; TACA
hubs in El Salvador, Costa Rica, and Peru; Lufthansa Italia hubs in Milan;
EasyJet hubs in Geneva, Madrid, Milan, and the UK;
• Mergers and Acquisitions: e.g., Lufthansa acquired Austrian, Swiss, BMI, and
Brussels;
• Minority Ownership: e.g., Delta in Virgin Atlantic; Lufthansa in JetBlue;
Etihad in Air Berlin; Alitalia in Jet Airways; and
• Joint Ventures: e.g., Qantas established Jetstar in Singapore; Singapore Air-
lines established Tiger in Australia; Air Asia operates affiliates in Thailand,
Malaysia, and Indonesia.
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• revenue, cost, and profit sharing.85
The European Commission may exempt a restrictive alliance
if it concludes that the overall benefits of the transaction out-
weigh its anticompetitive effects and if those benefits will be en-
joyed by consumers. Specifically, the EU evaluates the following
criteria:
(a) the agreement must contribute to improving the production
or distribution of goods or promote technical or economic pro-
gress, (b) consumers must receive a fair share of the resulting
benefits, (c) the restrictions imposed by the agreements must be
indispensable to the attainment of these objectives, and (d) the
agreements must not afford the parties the possibility of eliminat-
ing competition in respect of a substantial part of the products or
services in question.86
Recognizing that alliances may reduce competition, the EU
Commission focuses on potential barriers to new competitive
entry. These include:
• Regulatory barriers, such as government pricing restrictions
for indirect flights or the unavailability of necessary traffic
rights;
• Slot shortages at congested airports;
• Increased frequencies resulting from the cooperation;
• Network effects resulting from joint frequent flyer, travel
agency or corporate customer incentive schemes or re-
duced third carrier access to transfer passengers;
• “Behavioural” barriers arising from possible predatory pric-
ing or predatory capacity tactics.87
In reviewing the Star Alliance relationship between United,
Lufthansa, and SAS, the EU Commission concluded:
indirect flights . . . could constitute suitable alternatives to non-
stop services on long haul routes . . . [, and the] alliance partners
offered to surrender slots at Frankfurt airport to allow new air
services (either direct or indirect) on the routes concerned. . . .
In addition, new entrants using the slots, if they operate a non-
85 Kate Markhvida, supra note 59, at 317–18.
86 EUROPEAN COMMISSION & U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., TRANSATLANTIC AIRLINE AL-
LIANCES: COMPETITIVE ISSUES AND REGULATORY APPROACHES 14 (2010). See generally
Joos Stragier, Deputy Head of Unit DG Competition, Address at the European
Air Law Association Annual Conference: Current Issues Arising with Airline Alli-
ance (Nov. 5, 1999), http://ec.europa.eu/competition/speeches/text/sp19996
78_en.html [https://perma.cc/W3C6-FNHR].
87 Michael Gremminger, The Commission’s Approach Towards Global Airline Alli-
ances—Some Evolving Assessment Principles, 1 EC COMPETITION POL’Y NEWSL. 75, 78
(2003).
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stop service, will be admitted to the parties’ frequent flyer pro-
gramme [sic] and offered interlining facilities.88
While collusion (e.g., price fixing) and mergers are subject to
the jurisdiction of the DOJ, the DOT may confer antitrust im-
munity for airlines in international markets. It appears that anti-
trust immunity for the three U.S. members of the international
aviation alliance cartel relieves carriers from the consequences
of violations of at least two of the three principal targets of anti-
trust law: (1) collusion; (2) monopolization; and (3) predation.
Airlines have several motivations for creating alliances. These
include:
• the desire to achieve greater network economies of scale,
scope, and density;
• the desire to reduce costs by consolidating redundant
operations;
• the need to improve revenue by reducing the level of com-
petition wherever possible as markets are liberalized; . . .
• the desire to skirt around the nationality rules (which pro-
hibit multinational ownership) and cabotage (which pro-
hibits foreign carriers from flying domestic traffic)89;
• [the] ability to provide more capacity and enter new mar-
kets without having to make large capital expenditures for
aircraft purchases or airport infrastructure;
• [the] ability to generate thousands of new ‘on-line’ [sic]
city-pair combinations;
• [the] ability to extend the reach and scope of their fre-
quent flyer programmes [sic] to enhance consumer loyalty;
• [the] ability to generate . . . [additional] passengers per
flight;
• [the ability to enhance market power at hub airports mak-
ing it more difficult for new entry into the network’s
markets];
• [the ability to sell and market jointly to corporate
customers];
• [the] ability to capture market share from non-aligned
competitors;
88 Press Release IP/02/1569, European Commission, Commission Closes
Probe into KLM/NorthWest and Lufthansa/SAS/United Airlines Transatlantic
Air Alliance (Oct. 29, 2002).
89 Paul Stephen Dempsey, Dir. at Inst. of Air & Space L. McGill Univ., Lecture
on Airline Alliances 12 (2011), https://www.mcgill.ca/iasl/files/iasl/Work-
shop_6-Dempsey.pdf [https://perma.cc/2DHY-YQ8Q].
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• [the] ability to fix prices with competitors in dominant
markets;
• [the] ability to reduce competitive capacity in key markets
to improve yields;
• [the achievement of] a reduction in the costs of equipment
and services from third party vendors as a result of greater
bargaining power of pooled purchases;
• [the] reduction airport handling, airport operations, selling
and ticket costs as a result of economies of scale and the
sharing of support services;
• [the ability to reduce travel agent and GDS costs as a result
of enhanced oligopsony market power]; and
• [the] ability to pool costs and revenue to share risks and
rewards.90
Yet, many of these alleged benefits can be obtained without
immunity. End-to-end ticketing, baggage, and joint fare agree-
ments preceded alliances by decades and do not pose the con-
cerns that horizontal agreements pose. Reciprocal sharing of
lounges and frequent flyer programs can likely also be accom-
plished without antitrust immunity. The nefarious conduct im-
munity adds is collusion on fares, frequency, and capacity in
competitive markets, all of which are manifestly anticompetitive.
Alliances can also drain traffic from non-aligned competitors,
which further reduces consumer choice.
Three global alliances have emerged—Star, SkyTeam, and
Oneworld. As of May 2017, these three alliances accounted for
seventy-six percent of U.S.-Europe seat capacity.91 Table 5 pro-
vides data on their respective market shares.
Table 5 – Airline Alliances, Relative Size
Star Skyteam Oneworld
2005 2010 2015 2005 2010 2015 2005 2010 2015
Airlines n.a. 26 27 n.a. 13 20 n.a. 12 14
Passengers (million) 348 545 641 321 384 665 223 298 557
Countries 139 181 192 137 169 177 135 145 161
Destinations 795 1,130 1330 685 815 1062 599 679 1016
90 DEMPSEY, EUROPEAN AVIATION LAW, supra note 46, at 154–55(citations omit-
ted); see also Andrew Light, European Airline Industry Review, SALOMON SMITH BAR-
NEY at 32 (Oct. 20, 2000).
91 See The US Department of Transportation Gets Tough on Antitrust Immunity, 26
GOV’T AFFAIRS J. EMIRATES 1, 2 (May 2017), https://cdn.ek.aero/downloads/ek/
pdfs/open_sky/Open_Sky_May_26.pdf [https://perma.cc/P6T6-ZTDR].
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Pursuant to the Federal Aviation Act, the USDOT may ex-
empt an intercarrier agreement from the antitrust exposure “to
the extent necessary to allow the person to proceed with the
transaction” if it concludes the exemption is required by the
public interest.92 In approving an application for antitrust im-
munity, the USDOT must conclude that the agreement will not
enable the participating airlines to eliminate actual or potential
competition which might enable them to raise price above, or
reduce services below, competitive levels. Nevertheless, the US-
DOT may approve an intercarrier agreement that substantially
reduces competition if the agency finds the agreement is “neces-
sary to meet a serious transportation need or to achieve impor-
tant public benefits” that cannot be realized “by reasonably
achievable alternatives that are materially less anticompeti-
tive.”93 Among the public benefits that have been identified by
the USDOT have been international comity and foreign policy
considerations.
In determining whether to issue antitrust immunity to an in-
tercarrier agreement, the USDOT ostensibly asks the following
questions:
• Would the intercarrier agreement substantially reduce or
eliminate competition or facilitate the abuse of market
power? Would the agreement result in an increase of mar-
ket concentration? The burden of proof on these questions
lies with the opponent(s) of the transaction.
• If the agreement would have such adverse competitive con-
sequences, the USDOT asks whether the agreement is nec-
essary to meet serious transportation needs or achieve
important public benefits? The burden of proof on this
question lies with the applicant(s).
• If the USDOT concludes that the transaction would meet
serious transportation needs or important public benefits, it
evaluates whether those needs or benefits can be achieved
by reasonably available alternatives that are materially less
anticompetitive? The burden of proof on this question lies
with the opponent(s) to the transaction.
• The USDOT also asks whether the agreement is required by
the “public interest”? The agency is authorized to exempt
the agreement from the antitrust laws “to the extent neces-
92 49 U.S.C. §§ 41308, 41309; see also DEMPSEY, EUROPEAN AVIATION LAW, supra
note 46, at 174 (citations omitted).
93 49 U.S.C. § 41309(b)(1)(A), (B); 14 C.F.R. Part 212.
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sary to allow the applicant(s) to proceed with the transac-
tion” if it finds the exemption is required by the “public
interest.” Among the public interest criteria deemed essen-
tial to the issuance of antitrust immunity, the USDOT insists
that the foreign airline’s domicile State has concluded an
“open skies” agreement with the United States. The US-
DOT also examines whether the alliance will benefit trav-
elers by enabling the allied airlines to offer better and more
efficient service, or “new on-line services” [sic]?94
If the application for antitrust immunity contemplates a joint
venture that resembles a merger, the agency claims to use the
Clayton Act analysis, which includes the following questions:
• Will the intercarrier agreement substantially reduce compe-
tition and/or enable the increase and abuse of market
power?
• Will it cause potential competitive harm?
• Will new competitive entry by other airlines into the market
be sufficient to counteract competitive harm?95
In applying these criteria, the USDOT has concluded that
“the pro-competitive effect of global alliances is particularly evi-
dent in the case of the behind- and beyond-markets where inte-
grated alliances with coordinated connections, marketing, and
services can offer competition well beyond mere interlining. In-
tegrated alliances can, in short, offer a multitude of new on-line
[sic] services to thousands of city-pair markets, on a global ba-
sis.”96 They do this through the deceptive practice of “code-shar-
ing,” whereby the allied carriers place their flight number on
another airline’s flight.97 USDOT has praised code-sharing as
“an important source of new entry, new service, lower fares, and
competition,” and “the pro-competitive and pro-consumer fea-
tures of code-share agreements.”98
94 See Dempsey, Lecture on Airline Alliances, supra note 89, at 21, 23.
95 See id.
96 Application of American Airlines et al., DOT Order 2000-4-22, at 9 (2000).
97 For a list of DOT approved code-shares as of July 31, 2016, see U.S. DEP’T OF
TRANSP., CODE SHARE REPORT (2016) https://www.transportation.gov/sites/dot
.gov/files/docs/July%202016%20Code%20Share%20Report.pdf [http://perma
.cc/N55D-9KHP].
98 Joint Application of United Air Lines, Inc., and All Nippon Airlines, Ltd., DOT
Order 99-8-14 (1999). Jan K. Brueckner, A Panel Data Analysis of Code-Sharing,
Antitrust Immunity, and Open Skies Treaties in International Aviation Markets, 30 REV.
INDUS. ORG. 39 (2007); Harumi Ito & Darin Lee, Domestic Code Sharing, Alliances,
and Airfares in the U.S. Airline Industry, 50 J.L. & ECON. 355 (2007); Jong-Hun Park
& Anming Zhang, An Empirical Analysis of Global Airline Alliances: Cases in North
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However, code-sharing connections are not actually online
services. They are merely interline operations pretending to be
something they are not. Moreover, preferential interlines mas-
querading as on-line services effectively steal traffic from non-
preferential interlines, thereby adversely affecting both competi-
tion and consumer convenience.
The USDOT has defended its insistence that competition is
not impacted negatively through the issuance of antitrust immu-
nity by emphasizing the opportunity for new entry presented by
“open skies” bilateral air transport agreements, as well as the
“competitive discipline afforded by competing U.S. hubs and ex-
isting competition from one-stop and connecting services. . . .”99
In one decision, the USDOT stated, “Because of the open-skies
accords, any U.S. carrier may serve any of these foreign markets
from any point in the United States.”100
Nonetheless, despite the theoretical opportunity for new en-
try afforded by the “open skies” bilateral air transport agree-
ments, the ability of a new entrant to successfully provide
sustainable competitive service is handicapped if it does not
maintain a connecting hub at least at one end of the city-pair
spoke. Moreover, one-stop and connecting services are mani-
festly inferior to non-stop operations. Nevertheless, the USDOT
sanguinely insists that, “a significant element in antitrust analysis
is the extent to which facilitating airline integration (through
antitrust immunity or otherwise) can enhance overall competi-
tive conditions.”101
If intercarrier agreements are as pro-competitive as the US-
DOT insists, why do they require immunity from the antitrust
laws? The USDOT confesses that if it did not issue antitrust im-
munity, the approved alliances “might be exposed to liability
under the antitrust laws. . . .”102 But, they would only be exposed
to liability under the antitrust laws if their activities were an-
ticompetitive, not because they were pro-competitive.
Atlantic Markets, 16 REV. INDUS. ORG. 367 (2000). Other studies suggest that code-
sharing has resulted in consumer price increases. See, e.g., Armantier & Richard,
Evidence on Pricing from the Continental Airlines and Northwest Airlines Code-Share
Agreement, ADVANCES IN AIRLINE ECONOMICS 1, Elsevier Publisher, 91–109 (2006);
P. Gayle, An Empirical Analysis of the Competitive Effects of the Delta/Continental/North-
west Codeshare Alliance, 51 J.L. & ECON. 743 (2008).
99 Application of American Airlines et al., DOT Order 2000-4-22, at 10 (2000).
100 American Airlines and the TACA Group Reciprocal Code-Share Services Proceeding,
DOT Order 97-12-35, at 19 (1997).
101 Application of United Airlines et al., DOT Order 99-8-14, at 53 (1999).
102 Applications of American Airlines et al., DOT Order 97-6-30, at 53 (1997).
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The USDOT has confessed, “The practice of excluding air-
lines from participating in a particular code-share arrangement
can have adverse public consequences because code-sharing can
provide a primary, if not the only, method of entering or ex-
panding service in many international aviation markets.”103 In-
deed, with immunized intercarrier agreements, the
participating carriers are authorized to exclude non-alliance
member airlines from their preferential code-shares. But as
noted above, the USDOT insists that “open-skies” bilaterals will
ameliorate the anticompetitive consequences of alliances. Para-
doxically, the agency has confessed, “While we continue to have
concerns about the impact of exclusivity provisions in markets
that are not governed by open-skies agreements, we are satisfied
. . . that code-share exclusivity provisions would not inhibit com-
petition or otherwise adversely affect the public interest.”104
In order to dull some of the more oppressive anticompetitive
impacts of immunized alliances, the USDOT has sometimes im-
posed certain conditions upon them and limited them to five
year terms (though USDOT has never refused to renew them
beyond their five year terms). For example, the agency has occa-
sionally withheld antitrust immunity from “pricing, inventory or
yield management coordination or pooling of revenues, with re-
spect to unrestricted coach-class fares or any business or first-
class fares” in certain specified city-pair markets dominated by
allied airlines.105
Early USDOT issuances of antitrust immunity included “carve
outs,” whereby the dominant city-pairs at which the allied carri-
ers maintained hub operations were exempted from antitrust
immunity. Former Deputy Assistant Attorney General R. Hewitt
Pate observed that,
When antitrust immunity has been sought, we have recom-
mended that USDOT “carve out” certain unrestricted fares in-
volving these city pairs from the order granting antitrust
immunity . . . . For example, the [Antitrust] Division recom-
mended that seven city pairs be carved out of the Delta/Swissair/
Sabena/Austrian alliance (Atlanta-Zurich, Atlanta-Brussels, Cin-
cinnati-Zurich, New York-Brussels, New York-Geneva, New York-
Vienna, and New York-Zurich); one for the American/Canadian
Air alliance (New York-Toronto); two for the United/Lufthansa
103 Joint Application of United Air Lines, Inc., and All Nippon Airlines, Ltd., DOT
Order 99-8-14 (1999).
104 Id.
105 Application of American Airlines et al., DOT Order 2000-5-13 (2000).
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alliance (Washington-Frankfurt and Chicago-Frankfurt); and two
for the United/Air Canada alliance (Chicago-Toronto and San
Francisco-Toronto).106
More recently, however, the USDOT has alleged that carve-
outs inhibit alliance efficiencies and has decided to no longer
impose “carve-outs” and remove many “carve-outs” that it had
imposed in earlier decisions.107
Exclusive dealing clauses in code-sharing agreements have
been rejected unless the country that the carrier will operate to
and from has concluded an “open skies” bilateral air transport
agreement with the United States.108
The USDOT turned a sharp corner in 2005 when it an-
nounced that antitrust immunity for alliances would no longer
be granted unless the carriers created “metal-neutral joint ven-
tures,”109 arguably the least competitive alternative short of an
outright merger. In other words, the USDOT was insisting on
further anticompetitive collusion as a prerequisite for antitrust
immunity.
What is metal neutrality? The USDOT defines it as
an industry term meaning that the partners in an alliance are
indifferent as to which operates the ‘metal’ (aircraft) when they
jointly market services. Without a metal-neutral sales environ-
ment, the partners have a strong economic incentive to book pas-
sengers on their own aircraft in order to retain a larger share of
the revenue for themselves, which may not be in the best interest
of the consumer or the alliance as a whole. Metal neutrality may
be achieved through revenue and/or comprehensive benefit
sharing arrangements.110
As the USDOT further noted,
106 International Aviation Alliances: Market Turmoil and the Future of Airline Compe-
tition: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust, Competition, and Bus. Fts. of the S.
Judiciary Comm., 107th Cong. 11–12 (2001) (statement of R. Hewitt Pate, Deputy
Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division).
107 U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., Airline Alliances Operating with Antitrust Immunity, 2, 4,
6–7, 10, 12 (last updated May 10, 2017), https://www.transportation.gov/sites/
dot.gov/files/docs/mission/office-policy/aviation-policy/9906/170104-all-immu-
nized-alliances-05102017.pdf [https://perma.cc/C3F2-2A9L]. See, e.g., Joint Appli-
cation of Air Canada, the Austrian Group et al., DOT Order 2009-7-10, at 20 (July 10,
2009).
108 See, e.g., Application of American Airlines et al., DOT Order 99-6-6 (1999).
109 See generally Joint Application of Alitalia-Linee Aeree Italiance-S.p.A. et al., DOT
Order 2005-12-12, at 2, 30, 37 (Dec. 22, 2005).
110 Joint Application of American Airlines, British Airways PLC et al., DOT Order
2010-2-8, at 4 n.6 (Feb. 13, 2010).
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We have emphasized the high standard necessary to justify a
grant of immunity and the need for applicants to demonstrate
that substantial public benefits are likely to be produced at the
time the immunity is requested. For example, in the SkyTeam
case in 2005, we tentatively denied a request for antitrust immu-
nity because there was both insufficient information in the re-
cord to make a complete assessment of public benefits and the
competitive conditions were in flux. There . . . the Department
identified barriers to integration that we believed reduced the
incentives of the airlines to integrate their operations and pass
on the benefits of immunized cooperation to consumers.111
Remarkably, U.S. regulators insist that in order to receive anti-
trust immunity, the participating must establish “metal neutral
joint ventures.” Yet such an arrangement is the most anticompe-
titive alternative short of an outright merger. With a straight
face, the USDOT acknowledges that, although antitrust immu-
nity authorizes alliance members to fix prices and ration capac-
ity, the agency insists that consumers somehow benefit from
such joint ventures in the form of lower prices.112
Normally, antitrust analysis assumes that reduced competition
can create market power in which service declines and/or prices
increase. But, the USDOT analysis stands this presumption on
its head.
The USDOT assumes that antitrust immunity is necessary for
airlines to eliminate “double-marginalization.” To explain the
problem antitrust immunity seeks to remedy, the following is a
simplified example. First, assume Carrier X operates from A to
B, and Carrier Y operates from B to C. Carrier X’s nonstop fare
between A and B is $50, and Carrier Y’s nonstop fare between B
and C is also $50. They may offer interline service between A
and C as a combination of their two point-to-point fares for
$100. Further, assume they compete with Carrier Z, which oper-
ates nonstop from A to C but offers a nonstop fare between A
and C for $90. Then, assume a passenger wants to fly from A to
C. Carrier Z offers a nonstop fare $10 lower than the combined
XY fare of $100, and Carrier Z offers a nonstop on-line flight as
opposed to the XY interline connection. In this example, Carri-
ers X and Y will sell virtually no seats in the A to C market until
111 Joint Application of Delta Airlines, Inc., Virgin Blue Airlines et al., DOT Order
2010-9-4, at 2 (Sep. 8, 2010).
112 See Paul Stephen Dempsey, Recent Books on International Law: Book Review:
The Principles and Practice of International Aviation Law, 110 AM. J. INT’L L. 159,
161–62 (2016).
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Carrier Z’s planes are full, and passengers are “spilled” to the XY
interline service. So, if Carriers X and Y want to participate
meaningfully as competitors on the A to C route, Carrier X and
Y will have to lower their respective point-to-point fares. This is
usually done through typical ticketing-and-baggage and joint-
fare agreements whereby the carriers will honor each other’s
tickets, provide through baggage handling from origin to desti-
nation, and provide a through combined fare. Assume Carriers
X and Y agree to lower their fares to $40 on interline customers,
combining X’s A to B $40 fare with Y’s B to C $40 fare results in
a through interline fare of $80. Now, the same customer want-
ing to fly from A to C has a choice: (1) an interline fare on
Carriers X and Y with a connection in B of $80; or (2) a nonstop
fare on Carrier Z of $90. Some passengers will pay a premium
for the higher nonstop fare;113 others will opt for the less-conve-
nient itinerary for a lower price. To add one more layer of com-
plexity to an intercarrier agreement, if Carriers X and Y also
want to mislead the customer into believing their interline flight
is an on-line flight, they can code-share so that both X and Y will
falsely appear to fly between A and C.
No doubt, lowering the fare from A to C by twenty percent
would enhance consumer welfare. However, the USDOT seems
to believe that prorating interline fares cannot be accomplished
without antitrust immunity. But in fact, carriers have engaged in
joint fare agreements in international aviation since the 1920s
under the auspices of IATA. Intercarrier agreements on fares on
end-to-end city-pairs have never created the antitrust heartburn
caused by pricing discussions on parallel routes.
Further, in granting antitrust immunity, the USDOT has re-
peatedly relied on a study produced by an airline industry con-
sultant that alleged consumer savings of between fifteen and
twenty-five percent resulting from double marginalization.114
This theory is “supported by a single study prepared by a paid
advocate for one of the [antitrust immunity] applicants, and
113 In fact, seventy-six percent of passengers in the trans-Atlantic market fly
non-stop even though prices are more than eight percent higher than connect-
ing fares. William Gillespie & Oliver M. Richard, Antitrust Immunity Grants to Joint
Venture Agreements: Evidence from International Airline Alliances, 78 ANTITRUST L.J.
443, 454 (2012).
114 Jan K. Brueckner & W. Tom Whalen, The Price Effects of International Airline
Alliances, 43 J.L. & ECON. 503, 521 (2000).
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based solely . . . on pre-1999 data.”115 Essentially, the USDOT
has adopted a presumption that prices fall whenever competi-
tion is circumscribed,116 which is about as counterintuitive as
any economic policy embraced by a government agency. Indus-
try expert Hubert Horan explained the fallacy of such specious
reasoning:
Under this theory [of double-marginalization], the only ways to
reduce the structurally higher costs of interline pricing are
merger or full immunity to collude on prices. . . . This theory is
completely indefensible. “Double marginalization” does not ex-
ist, never existed, and has absolutely nothing to do with the ac-
tual legitimate benefits of immunized alliances. The “double
marginalization” theory was created out of whole cloth . . .117
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that double marginaliza-
tion was an interline joint-fare problem that could only be reme-
died by antitrust immunity (which it is not), that is no
justification to authorize airlines to collude on pricing, schedul-
ing, and capacity on parallel point-to-point routes.
By 2008, the DOJ had had enough. It issued a fifty-five-page
objection to the issuance of additional antitrust immunity to
Star Alliance on grounds that the purported benefits alleged by
the USDOT had not been established. The DOJ found that the
benefits alleged from immunized elimination of “double-
marginalization” did not exist and that “connecting fares of-
fered by non-immunized alliances for transatlantic routes are no
more expensive than fares offered by immunized alliances.”118
Further, DOJ economists have studied the allegations of con-
sumer benefits resulting from airline antitrust immunity and
concluded that the data does not support such a claim. They
found that “grants of immunity to participants in international
alliances . . . have harmed consumers by raising prices on many
routes and have not delivered the benefits that the participants
claimed at the DOT.”119
In response, two former senior USDOT apologists published
an article boasting that “the emergence of alliances—and partic-
ularly immunized alliances—arguably has represented the most
115 Hubert Horan, “Double Marginalization” and the Counter-Revolution Against
Liberal Airline Competition, 37 TRANSP. L.J. 251, 261 (2010).
116 See id. at 269–76.
117 Id. at 273–74.
118 See Comments on Joint Application of Air Canada et al., DOT Order to Amend
2007-2-16, at 35-36 (June 26, 2009).
119 Gillespie & Richard, supra note 113, at 443, 467.
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important development in the industry since the introduction of
the jet aircraft.”120 In other words, the emergence of an anticom-
petitive global aviation cartel is the most important development
in the industry since the introduction of jet aircraft. That cartel
consists of three immunized alliances, each of which has signifi-
cantly reduced competition between its members and taken traf-
fic from non-aligned competitors. Why one would speak about
creating a global cartel with such pride is perplexing. The Econo-
mist said it best:
This lack of competition is partly the result of collusion sanc-
tioned by regulators. On transatlantic routes members within
each of the world’s three big alliances—Star, [O]neworld and
SkyTeam—share costs and agree on prices . . . .
[The USDOT] has not only given its blessing to the rise of alli-
ances, but actually requires airlines to collude fully within each of
their groupings, and to share costs and agree on prices . . . .
America’s main antitrust regulator, the Department of Justice
(D[O]J), is rightly sceptical [sic] of the notion that collusion
benefits consumers. It objected to the creation and expansion of
the three transatlantic cartels, only to be ignored by the [US-
DOT], which it cannot overrule on such matters. Earlier this year
an unofficial study by two of the D[O]J’s economists crunched
the most recent data available, and reached the opposite, and
more plausible, conclusion: that fewer competitors means higher
fares, as one would expect. The proponents of consumer-friendly
cartels still find that the data support their theory. But if such
drastically opposing conclusions can be drawn simply by shuf-
fling the figures a different way, it is surely best to believe the
outcome that most accords with common sense. A pity, then, that
the [USDOT] shows no sign of doing so.
Blessing the cartels across the Atlantic and Pacific was a mistake,
and should be reversed. Since the [USDOT] seems unlikely to do
that, Congress should hand its remaining antitrust powers to the
more pro-competition D[O]J.121
By 2010, the highest levels of integration under antitrust immu-
nity in “metal neutral” joint ventures had been achieved by the
following airlines:
• Air Canada, Lufthansa, and United-Continental (for Star);
120 Warren L. Dean & Jeffrey N. Shane, Alliances, Immunity and the Future of
Aviation, 22 AIR & SPACE LAW. 1, 17–18 (2010).
121 Open the Skies, ECONOMIST (Nov. 12, 2011), http://www.economist.com/
node/21538149 [https://perma.cc/6TDG-2VAJ]. This position is largely echoed
in Charles N.W. Schlangen, Differing Views of Competition: Antitrust Review of Interna-
tional Airline Alliances, 2000 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 413, 414–15, 443–46 (2000).
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• Air France-KLM, Alitalia, and Delta (for SkyTeam);
• American, British Airways, and Iberia (for Oneworld).122
Table 6 lists the active intercarrier relationships that enjoy an-
titrust immunity as of 2017. Note that the global alliances were
reduced from four to three after Air France acquired KLM in
2004, folding KLM into the SkyTeam alliance. Northwest was
left without a major European alliance partner, leading to
Delta’s acquisition of Northwest in 2008. The three alliances
(SkyTeam, Star, and Oneworld) collectively account for more
than eighty percent of the passenger traffic flying between the
United States and EU.123 Note also, that the tentacles of immu-
nized alliances have now extended beyond the transatlantic
U.S.-EU market, spreading to Asia and Australia.
Table 6 – Active Alliances Immunized by USDOT124
Sky Team Star Oneworld Other
Delta/Air France- United/Air Canada American/Lan SAS/Icelandair











Finally, at the end of the Obama Administration in November
2016, the USDOT issued two decisions that appeared to reflect
some measure of newly discovered caution with respect to the
Pandora’s box it had opened. Regarding the first decision, Delta
Air Lines and Aeromexico sought antitrust immunity for a metal
neutral joint venture.125 Although Mexico had concluded an
“open skies” bilateral air transport agreement with the United
States, the USDOT expressed concern with the lack of trans-
122 See EUROPEAN COMMISSION & U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., TRANSATLANTIC AIRLINE
ALLIANCES: COMPETITIVE ISSUES AND REGULATORY APPROACHES 7–8 (2010).
123 Gillespie & Richard, supra note 113, at 443, 446.
124 This data is as of January 2017. Airline Alliances Operating with Antitrust
Immunity, supra note 107.
125 Joint Application of Delta Air Lines & Aerovias de Mexico, S.A. DE C.V., DOT
Order 2016-11-2, at 1–3 (Nov. 4, 2016).
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parency in slot allocations at Mexico City’s Benito Juarez Inter-
national Airport (MEX) and that the two carriers controlled
nearly fifty percent of the slots at that airport, which might en-
able them to exert market power at MEX and New York’s John
F. Kennedy Airport (JFK). It therefore conditioned the grant of
antitrust immunity by requiring the carriers to surrender twenty-
four pairs of slots at MEX and six slots at JFK to U.S. or Mexican
low-cost carriers, while also limiting approval to a five-year
term.126
Also in November 2016, the USDOT denied the application
of American Airlines and Qantas for antitrust immunity on
grounds that if approved, the allied carriers would account for
nearly sixty percent of United States-Australia traffic, and the
largest market share in nearly 200 city-pairs, enabling the alli-
ance to exert market power. Emphasis was placed on the unique
geographic and demographic characteristics of the United
States-Australia market, as few passengers connect via intermedi-
ate points, and there is limited flow within or beyond Australia.
For the first time, the USDOT concluded that “many public ben-
efits from customer service coordination could be obtained
through traditional arms-length cooperation such as codeshar-
ing.”127 The USDOT also recognized that immunizing alliances
often has the “effect of limiting access to their networks by com-
petitors or independent airlines.”128 The USDOT further con-
cluded that the proposed alliance “would substantially reduce or
eliminate competition at the network, country-pair, and city-pair
levels . . .” and enable the applicants to “unreasonably exclude
present and future competitors from the market.”129 The US-
DOT found that the proposed benefits alleged by the applicants
were “likely to be limited, delayed, or ultimately not realized at
all, due to a lack of adequate competition to discipline the
alliance.”130
It remains to be seen whether this represents a long-overdue
epiphany in public policy or merely just more restrictive deci-
sions limited to the unique factual circumstances posed by these
two applications.
126 Id.
127 Joint Application of American Airlines & Qantas Airways, DOT Order 2016-11-
16, at 2 (Nov. 18, 2016).
128 Id. at 17.
129 Id. at 18.
130 Id. at 19.
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IV. ANALYSIS
The competitive landscape in international aviation has
changed enormously during the last decade and a half. Massive
mergers have reduced competition as, in the United States,
seven major network airlines have been reduced to three. Fur-
ther, in the EU, the British Airways, Lufthansa, and Air France
conglomerates too have reduced network competition. The reg-
ulators have insisted on “metal-neutral joint ventures” as the
price of admission for antitrust immunity. Three carriers on
each side of the Atlantic now dominate transatlantic traffic in
“metal neutral joint ventures” with antitrust immunity. In fact,
the USDOT’s insistence on “metal neutral joint ventures” as the
price for admission to antitrust immunity, coupled with the con-
solidation of major airlines on both sides of the Atlantic, has
created the global oligopoly of Star, SkyTeam, and Oneworld.
As the DOJ’s analysis has revealed, the market power that
emerged from this antitrust abdication has resulted in consumer
harm.
Meanwhile, many major U.S. and EU alliance airlines com-
plain about the alleged subsidies received by the Middle East
airlines, which operate from countries without State aid prohibi-
tions. Several U.S. and EU airlines seek a roll back from the
ubiquitous “open skies” bilateral air transport agreements with
the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Qatar.131 Airlines are also
immune from General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS)
anti-dumping prohibitions.132 The result has been a regulatory
mess with no clear solutions.
The USDOT has embraced a largely schizophrenic approach
to airline competition. On one hand, it has concluded liberal-
ized “open skies” air transport agreements with more than 120
States.133 On the other hand, it has also enabled airline competi-
tors to fix prices and limit capacity on common routes. Al-
though the former enhances competition, the latter does the
opposite. If “open skies” is the competitive Dr. Jekyll, antitrust
immunity is the anticompetitive Mr. Hyde.
131 The United States has an arsenal of regulatory, statutory, and treaty coun-
termeasures it could employ should it conclude that the competition provided by
the Gulf carriers is unfair. See DEMPSEY, supra note 20, at 121–64.
132 See DEMPSEY, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL AIR LAW, supra note 49, at 881–83.
133 James Reitzes & Diana Moss, Airline Alliances and Systems Competition, 45
HOUS. L. REV. 293, 294–96, 303–05 (2008).
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Code-sharing and antitrust immunity exist as a means to skirt
around the statutory foreign ownership restrictions. While the
USDOT has significantly liberalized those restrictions, permit-
ting, via regulatory fiat, foreign equity investment of up to forty-
nine percent non-voting stock, thereby diluting the statutory re-
quirement that no more than twenty-five percent of U.S. airline
voting stock may be owned by foreign citizens, and U.S. airlines
must be owned and controlled by U.S. citizens. USDOT efforts
to bend these rules further have been prohibited by Congress.
These statutory prohibitions, as well as the “significant owner-
ship and control” requirements in many bilateral air transport
agreements, prohibit mergers of U.S. airlines with foreign carri-
ers. It is clear that the USDOT is using antitrust immunity to
allow carriers to violate the antitrust laws; in effect, it is also us-
ing antitrust immunity to enable carriers to breach the statutory
foreign ownership and cabotage prohibitions.134 Beyond flaunt-
ing the statutory prohibitions, the anticompetitive impact of
code-sharing and antitrust immunity is also troublesome. More
than one airline has had to abandon international nonstop mar-
kets once an immunized code-share alliance has been author-
ized.135 The loss of competition has translated into higher fares
for consumers.136 For example, soon after the United/Luf-
thansa Star alliance was given antitrust immunity, Delta closed
its Frankfurt hub, TWA dropped its New York-Frankfurt flights,
and American Airlines withdrew from Miami-Frankfurt and Chi-
cago-Dusseldorf.137
Once the USDOT approved the British Airways/American
Airlines Oneworld alliance, US Airways was left without a major
European partner. TWA was also without membership in a ma-
jor alliance. Both carriers’ financial position worsened as trans-
atlantic interline traffic demand softened. TWA produced a
study entitled The Anticompetitive Nature of Airline Alliances138
before it fell into bankruptcy. After Delta abandoned Swissair
134 “Code-sharing does not violate the letter of U.S. law because the airplane
actually carrying passengers within the United States is owned and operated by
U.S. nationals. It does, however raise questions as to whether the spirit and intent
of U.S. law is violated.” Howard Kass, Cabotage and Control: Bringing 1938 U.S.
Aviation Policy into the Jet Age, CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 143, 164 (1994).
135 Linda Goldberg, International Airline Partnerships Are Drawing Praise—And
Some Flak, HOUS. CHRON., Jan. 10, 1999, at 1.
136 RIGAS DOGANIS, THE AIRLINE BUSINESS IN THE 21ST CENTURY 75 (2001).
137 Scott McCartney, Are Airline Alliances Bad News for Consumers? WALL ST. J.,
Jun. 17, 1997, at B1.
138 Goldberg, supra note 135.
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and Sabena in favor of the Skyteam alliance with Air France,
both Swissair and Sabena collapsed into bankruptcy. Airlines
not allowed to join the three major global alliances often lose
traffic to the cartel.
“The telephone regulators insist on ‘seamless interconnectiv-
ity.’ The airline regulators allow ‘preferential connectivity.’”139
Seamless connectivity enables more competitors to enter the
market for network services; preferential connectivity can effec-
tively circumscribe the ability of new competitors from exchang-
ing traffic with dominant providers.
Are alliances pro-competitive, or anticompetitive? Proponents
of alliances point to the following consumer benefits:
• Beyond-segment competition;
• “One-stop travel purchase services;
• Joint frequent flyer benefits;
• Reciprocal airport lounge access;
• Seamless connectivity of passengers and luggage; and
• Coordinated arrival and departure scheduling.”140
One must remember that the statutory language involving the
issuance of antitrust immunity to an anticompetitive agreement
requires that immunity only be conferred when it is necessary to
meet a serious transportation need or important public benefits,
and there is no less-anticompetitive alternative. This author sub-
mits that all of the aforementioned public benefits can be
achieved without serious threat of antitrust enforcement. It is
collusion of airlines on pricing, entry, capacity, frequency, and
marketing in competitive markets where antitrust immunity has
the most value to the carriers but also poses the most significant
burden on both consumers and competitors.
Alliances, particularly those involving code-sharing, price fix-
ing, and capacity rationalization, can reduce competition141 in
139 Dempsey, Lecture on Airline Alliances, supra note 89, at 33. Although the
airline regulators embrace preferential connectivity with partner common carri-
ers, the telephone regulators embrace nondiscriminatory connectivity with non-
partner common carriers.
140 DEMPSEY, EUROPEAN AVIATION LAW, supra note 46, at 154 (citation omitted).
141 “[A]irline alliances result in fewer remaining competitors with less overlap
and thus less inclination to compete on prices. . . . As a result of the large airline
alliances, competition has already diminished on some routes to gateway Euro-
pean cities dominated by alliances.” Stephen McShea, The “Dominant Position”
Doctrine and the European Union’s Response to the British Airways/American Airlines
Alliance, 23 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 71, 87 (1999).
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ways that injure competitors142 and consumers.143 Code-sharing
itself can be a predatory weapon,144 resulting in higher fares or
the foreclosure of competitors from markets,145 while deceiving
consumers into purchasing a product different from that actu-
ally being provided.146 Thus, awarding antitrust immunity to
competing airlines results in the loss of independent competi-
tors and in higher fares.147
142 “This form of systems competition, the hub-and-spoke model, creates seri-
ous anticompetitive concerns as alliances protect their respective hubs through
predatory pricing or the threat of pricing below cost.” W. Robert Hand, Continen-
tal Joins the (All)Star Alliance: Antitrust Concerns with Airline Alliances and Open-Skies
Treaties, 33 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 641, 678 (2011).
143 “[T]here can be little doubt that airline executives see alliances, especially
when they involve code-sharing and capacity rationalisation [sic], as a way of re-
ducing or limiting competition.” RIGAS DOGANIS, THE AIRLINE BUSINESS 95 (2d
ed. 2006).
144 See DEMPSEY, EUROPEAN AVIATION LAW, supra note 46, at 156.
145 U.S. Deputy Assistant Attorney General Pate stated that code-sharing “can
result in market allocation, capacity limitations, higher fares, or foreclosure of
rivals from markets, all to the injury of consumers.” Id. (citation omitted).
146 “Code sharing is unnecessary for, indeed irrelevant to, any legitimate pur-
pose or actual service. Code sharing doesn’t enable an airline to fly to any more
places. It just enables the airline to mislead travellers [sic] into thinking that they
fly to places they don’t. I call that fraud.” Edward Hasbrouck, Airline Alliances and
Code-Sharing, HASBROUCK.ORG https://hasbrouck.org/articles/alliances.html (last
updated Jan. 30, 2006).
147 Gillespie & Richard, supra note 113, at 443, 444, 468
The evidence shows that a grant of antitrust immunity to two com-
peting non-stop carriers in a trans-Atlantic route has a fare effect
that is equivalent to the loss of an independent competitor, and
fares are significantly higher in routes with fewer independent com-
petitors. This finding supports the normal antitrust presumption
that eliminating or substantially reducing competition through col-
laboration or merger enhances the market power of the remaining
suppliers and leads to higher prices, harming consumers. . . . [T]he
loss of competition in trans-Atlantic routes with non-stop service as
a result of antitrust immunity grants adversely affects consumers.
Alan Coles, chairman of the Guild of Business Travel Agents, stated, “Airlines say
that alliances can reduce costs, but we have seen no evidence of prices coming
down as a result.” See DEMPSEY, EUROPEAN AVIATION LAW, supra note 46, at 178
(citation omitted).
